Weltkrieg," Zeitgeschichte, vol. Dameron Army vom Innsbruck: StudienVerlag , pp. Vienna: LIT Verlag , pp. Vienna: Lit Verlag , pp. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers , pp. Budapest: Europa Institut Budapest , pp. Labohm, ed. Feld, ed. I: , II: , IV: Mannheim: Duden, , Cook, ed. New York: Garland , pp. I: 59f, II: , f. Boyer, ed. New York: Oxford University Press , p. Garraty and Mark Carnes, eds. New York: Oxford University Press , pp.
Kirkendall, ed. Truman Encyclopedia, Boston: G. Hall , Stettinius, Jr. Graham Jr. Hall , , Europa und der September Frentzos, eds. Heroic Age? Review of 2 volumes of B. Review of Larry Bland et al. Article review of Barbara Stelzl-Marx. Review of Elke Scherstjanoi, ed. Review of Manfried Rauchensteiner, ed. Review of Michael B. Munich: C. Review of Melyn P.
- The MageStaff.
- Terrestrial and Celestial Globes: Their History and Construction Including a Consideration of their Value as Aids in the Study of Geography and Astronomy (Volume I of II).
- Lady of Fire (The Chronicles of Celadmore Book 5).
Review of Paul Hollander, ed. Review of Jason P. Review of William M. In this Note I assume that the five requirements of an ideal democratic process are uncontroversial. I build on Dahls ideas by presenting several findings that have emerged, since his book was published, on both the theory and practice of democracy. I present them here in the belief that they add to our understanding of the strengths and limitations of the democratic ideal. The findings I report here are three in number. The first Section 2 concerns the logical structure of the democratic process.
I argue that there is a good reason for adopting the simple majority rule for aggregating individual values when it comes to voting for candidates in a political election. The second Section 3 relates democracy to incomplete and asymmetric information. Dahls argument enlightened understanding , that people should be enabled to obtain information if democracy is to flourish, has a converse: the very fact that people have private information of worth is itself an argument for democratic decision-making.
In short, democracy has an instrumental value: it enables people to make use of private information. The third finding I report. Section 4 also concerns a possible instrumental virtue of democracy. I discuss recent experiences in poor countries to show that democracy and civil liberties have been associated with growth in economic well-being. The three findings are discussed in the following three sections, sequentially. Robustness of Simple Majority Rule Since Arrows famous work Arrow, we have become familiar with the fact that democratic voting rules can be intransitive.
The classic illustration of this is Condorcets paradox of the simple majority rule. Nevertheless, in the political science literature e.
Dahl, the simple majority rule would appear to be the touchstone of the democratic process. For although Dahls five requirements do not specify the voting rule that best reflects the democratic ideal, he suggests that the rule that has historically been regarded as appropriate to the democratic process is the majority rule; and he observes Dahl, But ordinarily supporters of majority rule mean it in a much stronger sense.
In this stronger sense, majority rule means that majority support ought to be not only necessary but also sufficient for enacting laws. Emphasis in the original. Among democratic voting rules, the simple majority rule we will call this the majority rule has a particularly strong intuitive appeal. In Dasgupta and Maskin a new defence of majority rule is offered. It is shown that, among all voting rules satisfying a set of intuitively appealing conditions that have been much studied in the literature, majority rule is immune to cycles i.
To put it briefly, majority rule is robust. To illustrate, consider first the Condorcet-cycle. Consider three voters, who rank three alternatives labelled x, y, z as, respectively, x over y over z, y over z over x, and z over x over y. Simple majority rule. To confirm this, note that, since two of the voters prefer x to y, simple majority rule requires that x be ranked over y; likewise, since two of the voters prefer y to z, the rule requires that y be ranked over z. By transitivity, x should be ranked over z. But since two of the voters prefer z to x, the rule requires that z be ranked over x, which is a contradiction!
Why is majority rule, nevertheless, intuitively appealing? It is because the rule, especially when applied to choices over political candidates, possesses several compelling properties. First, it satisfies the Pareto principle: if all voters prefer alternative x to alternative y, the rule ranks x over y. Secondly, it is anonymous: the rule treats all voters symmetrically in the sense that the ranking is independent of voters labels.
Anonymity, therefore, captures the second of Dahls five criteria: voting equality among citizens. And thirdly, majority rule satisfies neutrality: its ranking over any pair of alternatives depends only on the pattern of voters preferences over the pair, not on the alternatives labels. Neutrality is symmetry with respect to alternatives. In the context of representative democracy, neutrality is a natural requirement of a voting rule: it prohibits procedural discrimination against candidates. Rules that violate neutrality have built into them preconceived rankings, for example, favouring the status-quo.
If preconceived social rankings are to be avoided, neutrality is the condition that can ensure its avoidance. But majority rule is not the only voting rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto principle; there is a vast array of others e. However, all are subject to Arrows stricture, that is, each will generate cycles for some configurations of preferences. In this context, Dasgupta and Maskin have constructed a new defence of majority rule when the number of voters is large.
They have shown that, among all voting rules that satisfy anonymity, neutrality and the Pareto principle, majority rule is immune to cycles i. To be precise, they have shown that if, for some domain of individual preferences, a voting rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto principle is transitive, then so is majority rule transitive on this domain.
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Moreover, unless a voting rule is itself the majority rule, there exists some domain of individual preferences on which majority rule is transitive, but the voting rule in question is not. The result captures the sense in which majority rule is robust. Democracy and Private Information In the previous section I identified the attraction of majority rule as an expression of the democratic decision-making process. In this section I develop the third of Dahls five criteria, namely enlightened understanding, quoted above.
It can be argued that limited knowledge and asymmetric information among members of a demos do not merely call out for the creation of opportunities among people to acquire more information, they also provide an instrumental justification for democracy. It has been said that democracy is the worst system of government, except for the other systems of government. Incomplete and asymmetric information among members of a demos provide an explanation for why the epithet is true.
Elsewhere Dasgupta, I have argued this by appealing to recent findings on the management of local common-property resources among rural communities in poor countries. These empirical findings reveal, in particular, the instrumental value of local participatory democracy in enabling privately-held information to be put to work in social decision-making processes. Related to this, political scientists have drawn attention to the positive influence civic engagement can have on government performance in democratic societies Putnam, ; Cohen and Rogers, Their argument is that government accountability requires collective action.
But collective action requires co-ordination; more fundamentally, it requires that people trust one another to co-ordinate. Civic engagement creates trust by reducing the uncertainties each party harbours about others predilections and dispositions. Contrariwise, an absence of such. Recent empirical work on common-property resource management supports this reasoning by showing that trust can indeed be habit forming. Democracy and Human Development: Some Evidence. Is democracy associated with human development? For example, is growth in national income per head, or increases in life expectancy at birth and the infant survival rate, or improvements in literacy, greater in countries where citizens enjoy less curtailed civil and political liberties?
The case-by-case approach to such questions has enjoyed a long tradition, but it is often so case-specific that it is difficult to draw a general picture from the studies. An alternative is to conduct statistical analyses of cross-country data. In an early statistical inquiry, Dasgupta explored possible links between political and civil liberties and changes in the standard of living. The study was restricted to poor countries.
Only ordinal information was used and no attempt was made to search for causality in the relationships that emerged. Here I summarise the findings. There were 51 such countries with populations in excess of 1 million Summers and Heston, The period under observation was the decade of the s. The findings are reported in detail in the paper submitted to the Symposium. Here I summarise the findings: 1.
Political and civil rights are positively and significantly correlated with real national income per head and its growth, with improvements in infant survival rates, and with increases in life expectancy at birth. Real national income per head and its growth are positively and significantly correlated, and they in turn are positively and significantly correlated with improvements in life expectancy at birth and infant survival rates. Improvements in life expectancy at birth and infant survival rates are, not surprisingly, highly correlated. Political and civil rights are not the same.
But they are strongly correlated. Increases in the adult literacy rate are not related systematically to incomes per head, or to their growth, or to infant survival rates. They are positively and significantly correlated with improvements in life expectancy at birth. But they are negatively and significantly correlated with political and civil liberties.
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These observations suggest that literacy stands somewhat apart from other goods. It does not appear to be driven with the three other measures of the living standard being studied here. Furthermore, regimes that had bad records in political and civil rights were associated with good performances in this field.
I have no explanation for this, but it is difficult to resist speculating on the matter.
One possibility is that literacy was used by a number of States in the sample to promote the acceptance of established order. This would seem plausible in rural communities, where the classroom provides a relatively cheap means of assembling the young and propagating the wisdom and courage of the political leadership. Education in this case would be a vehicle for ensuring conformity, not critical thinking.
Of course, the correlation observed in the data does not imply causation. Each of the indices would in any case be endogenous in any general political theory. For example, it is most probable that democracy is correlated with some omitted feature e. We should also bear in mind that indices of political and civil liberties can change dramatically in a nation, following a coup detat, a rebellion, an election, or whatever; and as I used a six-year average index the period for them, we must be careful in interpreting the statistical results.
Subject to these obvious cautions, what the evidence seems to be telling us is that, statistically speaking, of the 51 poor countries on observation, those whose citizens enjoyed greater political and civil liberties also experienced larger improvements in life expectancy at birth, real income per head, and infant survival rates. The argument that de-. This seems to us to be eminently worth knowing. List of Literature Arrow, K. Second ed. Baland, J. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cohen, J. Rogers et al.
Dahl, R. Dasgupta, P. Putnam, R. Leonardi and R. We showed that legal positivism had allowed law to be transformed into an instrument at the service of totalitarian power. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was intended to reintroduce a concept of human rights based upon the precept: man, whatever he may be, is the supreme value. Inherent universal rights based upon this value represent a solid foundation for the internal and external peace of nations, for democracy, for development, and for international solidarity. Because of its universal range, the value which man represents requires the protection of a plurality of political institutions and legal instruments.
Their value will increase in proportion to their ability to honour human rights in specific contexts. Unfortunately, it has to be recognised that the values expressed in the Declaration of are increasingly under attack, even within the UN. The plurality that we have just mentioned does not exist anymore. This legitimate plurality tends increasingly to be eclipsed by a pluralism which affects the understanding of the universality of mans value and rights.
This pluralism represents the diversity of ways in which the value of man himself is understood and no longer relates to the plurality of the institutions designed to safeguard it. The idea of an objective, recognised value of man, prior to any declaration or ratification, has been deferred. A human being is no longer an objective value, a real value. He is, rather, a value constituted by voluntary subjects, who take it upon themselves to ascribe value to an individual and allocate rights therefrom.
Thus, given the essential link between democracy and human rights, the future of democracy is itself in danger. We shall demonstrate how this new perception of the value of man is expressed, firstly at a theoretical, and then at an institutional, level. Values have become the expression of the frequency of choice.
This then decides how positive law should be ratified. Human rights are therefore the necessarily provisional outcome of an ongoing process, the conclusions of which, reached by consensus, have an imperative force. They determine the practical rights of man. Those who break the consensus, the dissidents, are those who persist in declaring that man is valuable in himself, that he has an intrinsic value, that he is an objective value, a real value.
The purely consensual concept of value and human rights is further characterised by its scepticism and agnosticism. This is accompanied by an abandonment of traditional anthropocentrism. Ultimately, man is no more than a fragment of Nature, which itself also has rights, natural rights. Man must be prepared to be sacrificed, if necessary, to the needs and demands of the ecosystem. Short-circuited States The reappraisal taking place within the UN of values set forth in the Declaration is equally apparent both at a practical and at an institutional level. The consensus reached in international assemblies is invoked to pressurise nations into signing accords and conventions dealing with the new values and the new human rights reached by consensus.
Thereby human rights are defined in a voluntarist fashion by positive legal texts positive law thus coincides with natural law. Given that this is the case, one should not be surprised to observe that the insidious undermining of the value of man has culminated in a project for the substantial transformation of the UN. However, since the transformation of the UN into a system of world government has become ever more apparent. Now, when the UN purports to be a constituent authority on values and a source of corresponding new rights, when it whittles away national sovereignty, when it attempts to stifle divergence, it is engaged in establishing an International dreamed of by others in the past but now implemented by the UN in actual fact.
It should therefore be observed that in so far as it ceases to be the guardian of democratic values, the UN today is involved in the re-establishment of a perverse concept of human rights, similar in character to that which the former UN - that of or - had sought to eliminate forever. This is what happens when the abuses of liberalism form a negative conjunction with the abuses of socialism. In truth, Hobbes himself warned us about this: the frenzied exaltation of individual liberty leads sooner or later to the creation of the Leviathan.
In a society where each individual arrogates to himself or herself the right to define these values according to his or her taste, pluralism can only be temporary. The strongest impose their law on others and democracy becomes impossible. The great Declarations of rights all share the same common trait they are intended to make all the members of civil society participate in the smooth running of the political community.
In short, they have encouraged democracy. The Declaration of is obviously integral to this dynamic. A new impulse to this concept of the value of man in his entirety is now urgently needed. When, in a society, law and life as well as physical and psychological integrity are suspended as a result of consensus, the way is open for a regression to barbarism. Recent history confirms this: where perverse laws accord parents the right to dispose of the lives of their children, laws no less perverse will soon arise giving children the right to promote the death of their parents. No democracy worthy of its name can flourish in a situation where such laws exist.
In our paper we have shown how the intrinsic value of man can be promoted, with respect to human capital, human sociability, political participation, justice, and the place of man in nature. We shall confine ourselves here to a brief outline of some of these points. An examination of human capital should revolve around two axes.
Firstly, the very idea of human capital should be freed from the utilitarian connotations which all too frequently impoverish it. It is necessary to rise above this limited approach and reverse the economistic perspective, all the more given that work is at one and the same time both a right and a duty.
The promotion of human capital implies, furthermore, that all men have access to two spheres of values which are superior to the sphere of utilitarian values: the sphere of truth and the sphere of moral good. The inability, for most of the world population, today, to access knowledge, brings out the new face of apartheid.
In addition, as Amartya Sen has shown, free access to information and the dissemination of knowledge create the conditions for achieving political development and democracy. Contemporary thought on the moral value of justice should therefore not be restricted to reflections on the distribution of wealth. The question of subsidiarity as understood today should be regarded as primary. No man is a man too many on this earth. Each person has an irreplaceable contribution to make to the happiness of all. Let us now turn our attention to the case of the family.
This is a concrete value where the human being is welcomed with his or her differences, and where human.
It should therefore not be regarded purely as a means to economic prosperity As we have already shown with respect to human capital, a purely utilitarian or reductive vision of the family must be rejected in order fully to perceive what constitutes its incomparable value in forming the supreme value which is man. Political Democracy Political society is a concrete reality in which value is assessed in terms of means. Here also utilitarianism can only increase divisions causing people to desire that which others desire, utilitarianism generates violence.
In order to live together, men need truth, a truth which does not succumb to whims, to opinion, or to opportunity. When a society ceases to concern itself with the value which is truth, it becomes susceptible to ideological decoys and violence. Law: Towards Common Law Misunderstandings concerning plurality and pluralism are increased by the two great legal traditions which exist on a world scale. We are currently witnessing the confrontation of these two concepts of law. The tradition of Common Law, strongly entrenched throughout the former British Empire, is undoubtedly more receptive than the Latin tradition to the idea of consensus as a preferential source of law.
The Anglo-Saxon area thereby provides favourable terrain for the acceptance of an erratic conception of human rights. This is where serious confusion takes root. In the name of consensus, the attempt is made to impose legal instruments which render redundant the references to meta-legal values honoured by the Latin tradition and expressed in the great declarations of rights. This leads to a stance which the theoreticians and exponents of Common Law have generally hesitated to adopt, but which Hobbes addressed without hesitation in affirming that natural law and positive law ultimately have the same content and the same extension, and that they are no less than the expression of the sovereign will of Leviathan.
Under the Sign of the Cross Faced by the challenges which we have analysed, the Church appears more and more isolated. Today, she is probably the only institution to defend in an integral and unconditional way the intangible value of every human being, his right to life, to family, health, knowledge, property, liberty and association.
To the extent that she promotes these values, she promotes the conditions for the existence of democracy. If the Church plays such an important role in defending man, it is because mans value is rooted not only in his condition as a rational and free creature, but still more so in its adoption in Jesus. This condition of man paradoxically implies ignorance and creativity. Ignorance, because the Gospel is silent on the political programmes to be adopted for the promotion of human rights, democracy, the most just laws, etc.
Again ignorance in relation to economic measures which favour development and economic participation for the well-being of all. And creativity because neither the world nor society have been given by God to man as finished products, in which it is necessary only to stand back and wait. The honour for man is in having been associated by God to the genesis of history and, to a large degree, to have been entrusted with responsibility for it.
La Docta Ignorantia This is why the plurality of political, legal, economic and other options is essential to Christianity. It is not only a question here of a right to difference, but of a duty to be different. However, the aim will everywhere be the same: ultimately it will be a matter of promoting the value of man. But this shared objective will be upheld differently according to circumstances and according to conditions of life. The Church must therefore today embrace a new form of poverty. She must humbly practise the docta ignorantia. She must deny herself the clerical pretension to dictate, in the name of the Gospel, programmes of political or economic action for which she has neither the authority nor the competence.
She must not allow herself to use the Gospel as an ideological reference which legitimates any kind of programme of action whatsoever. But at the same time the Church must show that, since the act of faith is rational, the forms of behaviour inspired by it and expressing it must also be rational.
This is precisely the reason why faith stimulates the freedom to discuss the necessary plurality of concrete options and, at the same time, manifests the convergence of this plurality of options. This represents one of the essential aspects of religious freedom. It is thus a duty of the Church to denounce the agnostic pluralism which endangers the shared, and in truth unique, objective which must be attained by convergent paths. Addressing Secular Theocracies The current debate on values and democracy is therefore revealed in all its depth.
It bears not only on questions of anthropology or moral philosophy, on general theories of law or political philosophy. This debate is fundamentally of a religious nature. The Church is confronted by a secular theocracy before which she. The world today has a right to expect of the Church that she causes the splendour of the Cross to shine with a particular glory.
Like the Cross, the Church must appear as a sign of division. Christians should not advocate a unity or universality which would be dependent on the subjective wishes of certain individuals or the dictates of a certain power which aspires to hegemony. To its honour, our Academy is bound to involve itself in this immense debate and to bear with it the flame of hope, which, alone, can give credibility to its witness.
Dans une tude prcdente, nous avons examin les rapports troits entre les droits de lhomme et la dmocratie. La Charte de San Francisco et surtout la Dclaration Universelle des Droits de lHomme ont voulu couper court cette conception perverse du droit. Ces documents solennels ont prcisment voulu restaurer une conception des droits de lhomme protge contre les alas des volonts changeantes. Ils ont discern ce fondement dans un constat: lhomme, quel quil soit, est la valeur par excellence.
La Dclaration ne fait que constater cette valeur relle, objective; elle la proclame. Elle affirme quelle stend tous les hommes; quelle ne dpend pas des caprices des gouvernants. Elle trouve dans les droits universels inhrents cette valeur le fondement solide de la paix intrieure et extrieure des nations, du dveloppement, de la solidarit et des relations internationale. Protger et promouvoir ces droits de lhomme, cest la raison dtre de lONU; cest la mission qui lui est confie.
Parce que sa porte est La valeur de ceux-ci sapprciera leur capacit dhonorer les droits de lhomme dans les contextes particuliers. La valeur relative des diverses institutions et des diverses lois apparatra dans la proprit quont ces institutions et ces lois dhonorer lhomme, chaque homme, valeur par excellence. Il faut malheureusement constater que les valeurs qui sexpriment dans la Dclaration de sont de plus en plus battues en brche au sein mme de lONU. Il ne sagit plus de la pluralit dont il vient dtre question.
ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN: INTRODUCTION
Cette pluralit lgitime tend tre clipse de plus en plus par un pluralisme affectant la reconnaissance de luniversalit de la valeur de lhomme et de ses droits. Le pluralisme dont il est ici question ne se situe pas au mme niveau que celui o se trouve la pluralit que nous venons dvoquer. Dans ce dernier cas, celui de la pluralit, il sagissait de la qualit affectant des institutions diffrentes, certes, mais visant, toutes, le respect de la valeur de lhomme.
Le pluralisme auquel on fait dsormais souvent rfrence dans les confrences de lONU signifie la diversit des conceptions quant la valeur de lhomme lui-mme, et non plus de la pluralit des institutions appeles honorer celui-ci. Ce pluralisme signifie que les rfrences axiologiques proclames en sont dsormais en sursis et en quelque sorte geles. Elles ne valent plus que conditionnellement, cest-dire pour autant que telle assemble ou tel gouvernement consente les valider. Lide dune valeur objective reconnue lhomme, antrieurement toute dclaration, toute ratification, est suspendue.
La prsance est donne des sujets individuels ou collectifs qui dcident non seulement des droits de lindividu humain mais jusqu de son existence. Ltre humain nest plus une valeur objective, une valeur relle, cest--dire existant bel et bien; cest une valeur constitue ou non par des sujets volontaires, qui non seulement se rservent doctroyer de la valeur un individu, mais qui emploient leur pouvoir de dcision accorder ou refuser lexistence tel individu ou a telle classe dindividus.
Ds lors, puisquil y a un lien essentiel entre dmocratie et droits. Ainsi quon le constate, cette volution, que nous allons illustrer par divers exemples, ruine lide duniversalit que lon croyait indissolublement attache la valeur essentielle de tous les tres humains. Nous allons montrer plus en dtail comment se manifeste cette nouvelle perception de la valeur de lhomme dans les documents produits par lONU. Nous verrons comment cette nouvelle perception sexprime: dabord au plan thorique, ensuite au plan institutionnel.
Une conception purement consensuelle des droits de lhomme La conception de la valeur qui prdomine aujourdhui dans les milieux onusiens est rsolument empiriste. Avec de nombreux autres auteurs, Rawls2 a contribu ancrer la conviction quil fallait renoncer chercher des rfrences axiologiques admises par tous les hommes.
Ce pragmatisme radical dteint sur lensemble de lONU. Pour la technocratie onusienne, les valeurs sont le rsultat de calculs utilitaires rsolus par consensus ou dcids la majorit. Les valeurs sont des prfrences; elles sexpriment dans la frquence des choix et se mesurent dans des histogrammes: un triomphe pour la courbe de Gauss. Do la tyrannie de la majorit, dj dnonce par Tocqueville.
Le droit fondamental de lhomme, cest le droit satisfaire ses passions individuelles ft-ce celui de se donner la mort. Cest cela que devrait entriner le droit positif. Les droits de lhomme sont ainsi laboutissement, ncessairement provisoire, dune procdure incessante, dont les conclusions sont remettre constamment en question. Cependant, aussi longtemps quelles durent, ces conclusions successives auront une force imprative: elles dterminent les droits de lhomme. Puisque nous chouons dit-on 02 De la dmocratie en Amrique, II, 3. Ces dcisions volontaires sont seules constitutives de valeur; il faut donc sy soumettre.
Il faut sacrifier au mimtisme collectif, qui requiert lunanimit. Ceux qui brisent le consensus pratiquent donc le dissentiment; leur dissidence est intolrable, car elle mane dune conception de la valeur caractristique dun ge rvolu. Dsormais, les dissidents sont ceux qui persistent dclarer que lhomme vaut par lui-mme, quil a sa valeur intrinsque, quil est une valeur objective, relle.
Cest ce que proclamait la Dclaration de , qui dtaillait les implications de ces prmisses. LONU a ainsi pu lancer ce quelle-mme appelle de nouveaux droits de lhomme, face auxquels il est incongru et inoprant dopposer la conception raliste de ces droits. Au sein de lONU, cette rvolution, ou plutt cette involution, dans la conception des droits de lhomme sest faite sans bruit, par grignotement, jusqu ce que soit pratiquement dsactive la conception originaire et raliste de ces droits.
En arrire-fond, ce qui sest produit, cest une subversion dans lordre des valeurs. Aujourdhui, la valeur de lhomme nest plus labri de toute contestation. Voir Ren Girard, La violence et le sacr, Paris, d. Grasset, ; Id. Grasset, Ces nouveaux droits sont attachs des prfrences, des valeurs nouvelles. Ainsi, il nest plus question, comme il y a peine vingt ans, dautoriser lavortement, cest--dire de droger au droit fondamental lexistence.
De mme pour les nouveaux modles de famille, pour la sant gnsique, les droits reproductifs, lhomosexualit, lautonomie sexuelle des adolescents et des enfants, la strilisation, leuthanasie, etc. Labandon de lanthropocentrisme La conception purement consensuelle de la valeur et des droits de lhomme se caractrise encore par son relativisme intgral, son scepticisme et son agnosticisme. De lhomme, nous ne pouvons rien dire de vrai, mais les ncessits de la vie sont l et nous forcent des compromis. Il nest ds lors pas surprenant que cette impossibilit dans laquelle se trouverait lhomme de savoir qui il est, de connatre le sens de sa vie, saccompagne dun abandon de lanthropocentrisme traditionnel.
A leur manire, la philosophie mdivale et la philosophie moderne, notamment avec Descartes, avaient affirm la centralit de lhomme dans le monde, la vocation de lhomme connatre, organiser, transformer le monde. Lhomme est sujet daction responsable, sujet dhistoire, capable de comprendre, dimprimer sa marque la Nature. On insiste donc ici sur la raison et la volont libre caractristique de tous les hommes. La nouvelle conception des valeurs et des droits ne peut saccommoder de cet anthropocentrisme. La drogation signifie quon scarte de la norme lgale cense garantir, dans le droit positif, le droit inalinable de lhomme la vie.
Martins, , ; for further details, cf. The Soviet theory is elaborated in, e. Bovin, Peaceful Coexistence, in A. Prokhorov et al. Parteitag Khrushchev, O mirnom sosushchestvovanii Moscow: Gospolitizdat, For the English version, see Foreign Affairs 38 , The new doctrine drew heavily on nonSoviet sources such as the Pancha Sila, the principles of the relations between the Peoples Republic of China and India solemnly affirmed by Nehru and Chou En-Lai in , and the final declaration of the Third World countries conference in Bandung The famous principle of peaceful coexistence comprised mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, coexistence and economic cooperation.
Soviet leaders stressed, however, that the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism would not be given up, but rather be transferred to the field of cultural, political and economic competition. In their interpretation, peaceful coexistence would thus even promote the transition of the West to communism by demonstrating the superiority of the Socialist bloc. What was not openly declared was that at the same time economic cooperation with the West was to provide the ailing Soviet economy with much-needed imports and thus, reduce the burden on the overstretched Soviet industry as well as raise the mood of the exhausted East European workers.
It was within this framework of peaceful coexistence that Khrushchev as the emerging Soviet leader took the opportunity of improving the international climate by various means. This included dismantling Soviet bases in Finland and China, reducing Soviet forces, and agreeing on the State Treaty, which ended the Allied control and occupation of Austria. By so doing he not only abandoned a political and increasingly economic liability, but by insisting on Austrias becoming neutral he also achieved its not following West Germany into NATO.
Furthermore, by creating a model for sovereignty in neutrality, Khrushchev, albeit unsuccessfully, renewed the Soviet attempts to keep the FRG out of the Atlantic alliance. However, even though this failed, Austrias neutrality still had the potential of making life more difficult for NATO by driving a wedge between West Germany and Italy, and by possibly creating a model for other Western states. Last but not least, neutrality.
The concept of neutrality was relatively new in postwar Soviet policy. Until then, the general Marxist-Leninist attitude towards neutrality had been defined by the character of the international environment. In the event of a war between two imperialistic powers, the neutrality of a Socialist state was considered possible. If a war was revolutionary, defensive, or a war of liberation and therefore just according to Lenin, neutrality was not justifiable. Each country had to decide whether to be friend or foe; in Soviet eyes, countries who had declared themselves neutral during World War II, such as Switzerland or Sweden, supported the enemys war effort.
From the Soviet perspective, if neutrality was good or evil therefore depended on the side exercising it and the consequences it had for the motherland of socialism. The Cold War, the emergence of the two blocs, and their theoretical underpinning in Zhdanovs doctrine of the two camps, made neutrality even more impossible. Since the status of neutrality was defined as more progressive than capitalism but less advanced than socialism, it was designed to appeal to Western states and considered possible only there and, above all, in young nations of the Third World.
According to Soviet understanding, the obligations of a neutral state comprised non-participation in alliances and the active promotion of particularly Soviet dtente initiatives. For Soviet accounts, see B. Ganiushkin, Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, ; O. Tiunov, Neitralitet v mezhdunarodnom prave Perm: Gos. Universitet im. Gorkogo, ; A. Gromyko, S. Golunskii, and V. Khvostov, Dipomaticheskii slovar, 2nd ed. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 2, A remarkable initiative of the late Stalin years was the dictators note in March offering the reunification of a neutralized Germany.
However, there is consensus among most experts that the offer was not meant seriously. The doctrine of the two camps, one peaceful and led by the USSR, the other aggressive and led by the US, was declared by Soviet leadership member Andrei Zhadanov in This interpretation of neutrality was not adopted by Austria from the beginning; it insisted on its status as a Western democracy and rejected any kind of ideological neutralism. Nonetheless, despite the diverging Soviet and Austrian interpretations of neutrality, it was the Soviet-Austrian agreement achieved in April on Austrian neutrality that paved the way to a bilateral and, subsequently, an Austrian-East European dtente.
The Moscow Memorandum was a classic quid pro quo: The Soviet government expressed readiness to sign the State Treaty, the Austrian delegation agreed to launch an initiative for a declaration of Austrian neutrality.
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An Anschluss with Germany, as had occurred in , was forbidden. On 26 October , the Austrian parliament passed the promised constitutional law on Austrias permanent neutrality. The State Treaty and the declaration of neutrality, which were unofficially linked in the Soviet-Austrian memorandum, together with the personal relations established during the bilateral negotiations, laid the groundwork not only for Austrias international position, but also for bilateral relations with the East in general and the USSR in particular.
Although Austrian-Soviet relations would be tested in the following years by many controversial issues, including the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as Austrian ambitions to join the West European economic integration, they developed into a solid pillar of both countries foreign policies21 and, furthermore, provided the preconditions for the intensification of Austrian Ostpolitik and a relaxation in the bilateral relations with the East European states. While dtente, peaceful coexistence, and Austrian neutrality created the external setting, within Austria, political stability constituted the important precondition for embarking on this course, which was not without risk.
Leonhard, ed. However, even later, in the era of single-party governments from to , Austrian politics remained for the most part consensual. Although this has not yet been analyzed sufficiently, it can be argued that this hyper-stability A. Pelinka of the anti-Communist political spectrum the Communists never garnered more than five percent of the popular vote can be understood not only as an attempt to overcome the bitter partisan struggle of the interwar years, but also an attempt to deal with the threats real or perceived the Cold War posed to a small country located between the blocs.
This Austrian consensus was even more remarkable if one considers that the countrys general course in foreign policy was not without inner contradictions and at times resembled an attempt at squaring a circle H. The Austrian manner of dealing with these challenges was never clear-cut. However, while it seemed possible for Austrias economy to have the best of both worlds25 D.
Stiefel , not the same could be said with regard to the countrys international position. Thus, Austria in the late s gave in to Soviet and East European pressure and due also to Italian and French resistance gave up its ambitions for closer relations with the EEC. Herbert Dachs et al. For further detail, see idem, Die sowjetische Besatzung in sterreich und ihre politische Mission Vienna: Bhlau, , Helmut Kramer, Strukturentwicklung der Auenpolitik , in Dachs et al.
Given the countrys location between the battle lines of the military blocs in Europe, the State Treaty, with its tight restrictions on Austrian armed forces and its ban on weapons such as ground-air missiles, could not but have an impact on the countrys policy. Confronted with the massive threat posed to the West by the Warsaw Pact and numerous rumors about its aggressive intentions, Austrian political leaders but not those from the military chose to ignore the threat. Under NATOs expected protective umbrella and the impression of Soviet peaceful coexistence, as well as for various other reasons, armed neutrality thus soon turned into unarmed neutrality.
The countrys security, however, was never a result of its policy of neutrality, as many Austrians still believe, but rather a by-product of the balance of power between the two major alliances. Both architects of this early Austrian Ostpolitik, Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky , were, as political realists, well aware of the limits imposed on Western diplomacy in Eastern Europe and on East European regimes by the Soviet yoke.
However, they and the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz29 were determined to use their maneuvering space, small as it was, for reaching across the Iron Curtain, improving their countrys position behind it, strengthening its security, representing Western democracy, and for fostering dtente. Analyzing peaceful coexistence, dtente, and Ostpolitik, we must take into Innsbruck: Studienverlag, ; on the EEC issue in Soviet-Austrian relations, cf. On Austrian defense policy, cf. Manfried Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann, eds. From at the latest, these calls seem to have actually reflected Soviet wishes for dtente, peaceful coexistence, and East-West trade.
Furthermore, from the Soviet perspective, Austrian relations with the peoples democracies would not only break the Eastern blocs isolation but also distance Austria from the West and bring it closer to the East. In Soviet leadership member Mikoian explicitly welcomed the Austrian Ostpolitik. This trust was strengthened by certain personal relations and the fact that Austria, as a result of this settlement, actually started its Ostpolitik and Osthandel directly with the Kremlin and not, for instance, with neighboring Hungary. Such a move would undoubtedly have provoked suspicions that Austria had intentions of undermining Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.
Austrian Nachbarschaftspolitik was thus in line with Soviet interests and the country was a more or less trusted partner. Secondly, Austria was not strong enough for the Kremlin to interpret its neighborhood policy as a threat to the stability of the Eastern bloc. East European regimes perceived Austria as a capitalist country, but a country that was nevertheless friendly and, due to its neutrality, more progressive than the rest of the West. This does not mean that the ideological preconceptions were put aside. They simply no longer played such a large role as they had in the Stalin years.
Nonetheless, the Kremlin and the Communist regimes remained watchful: Whenever the attraction exerted upon East European populations by the Austrian model seemed too high, as during the Hungarian revolution and the Prague Spring , Communist propaganda campaigns were launched all over Eastern Europe in order to systematically destroy Austrias reputation in the East. However, there were also positive campaigns honoring Austrian neutrality in and its hospitality towards Khrushchev in And as if to underpin the role of the Communist parties in the Eastern bloc, special attention was given in their media to their Austrian fraSee the chapter in this volume by Norman M.
Bielka, sterreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn, In general Austria was not perceived as a threat to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Austria, in contrast to the Germany, was burdened neither by the existence of two states on its soil nor by the lingering question of lost eastern territories.
All these characteristics were in striking contrast to the first steps of the FRGs Ostpolitik in the late Adenauer and the Erhard years. On the other hand the Austrian policy found numerous parallels in Berlin Mayor Willy Brandts efforts to actively foster dtente, establish EastWest contacts and to improve relations step by step. They were realistic enough to understand that rapprochement was a precondition to transformation and that they first had to accept the postwar reality in order to later, possibly, be able to change it a little bit.
Both Brandt and the Austrians felt that it was better to agree with the Soviets to not agree, than not to talk at all.
Related Die Tschechoslowakei / Tschechische Republik in der KSZE 1990 - 1994 (German Edition)
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